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BOOK REVIEW
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS. By Leonard W. Levy. * New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985. Pp. xxii, 383. $29.95.
If You Haven't Read the Preface,
You Haven't Read the Book
Reviewed by Ellen K Solender**
The Framers of the Constitution wrote the speech and press clause1
so simply and directly that it does not seem possible it can mean exactly
what it says. Thus, most lawyers and constitutional law professors look
to its history in order to interpret the clause. The textbooks used in con-
stitutional law courses usually have an historical introduction before they
delve into the legal analysis of speech and press theory.2 Lawyers must
rely on historians to provide them with the information that these histori-
cal sections contain. The publication of a new historical study, such as
Emergence of a Free Press3 by Leonard W. Levy is, therefore, a most impor-
tant work.
Emergence of a Free Press is a major contribution to the historical litera-
ture of the first amendment because it relies on a wide variety of primary
sources. No serious scholar can fail to read it. The book also, perhaps
unwittingly, enhances the cause of an expansive view of the first amend-
ment through its emotionally charged preface.
The book does demonstrate the difference, when writing about his-
tory, between reading original sources, and relying on "contemporary"
anecdotes 4 or conjecture as to what the Framers of the Constitution were
thinking when they drafted the Bill of Rights. 5 The author's selection
and arrangement of original sources leads him to conclusions concerning
the meaning of the Constitution. These selections can be the result of
unconscious bias.6 The book teaches that, because of this problem, one
should be extremely cautious when forming conclusions after reading
* Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and Chairman, Graduate Faculty of History,
Claremont Graduate School.
** Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern
Methodist University.
1 Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2 See, e.g., T. B. CARTER, M. FRANKIuN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH
ESTATE, 11-18 (3rd Ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Carter, Franklin & Wright); G. GUNTHER, CONSTi-
TUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, 974-985 (1 1th Ed. 1985);J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 830-834 (3rd Ed. 1986).
3 L. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985), [hereinafter cited as EMERGENCE].
4 The best known and perhaps most cherished example of anecdotal or fabricated history is
Parson Weems' story about George Washington and the cherry tree. See M.L. WEEMS, THE I1FE OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: WITH CURIOUS ANECDOTES, EqUALLY HONOURABLE To HIMSELF AND EXEM-
PLARY To His YOUNG COUNTRYMEN... (9th ed. 1809).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
6 See, e.g., Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American
History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 800 (1986).
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original sources. After all, what colonial printers and editors actually
printed and distributed differed greatly from what the contemporary fol-
lowers of Blackstone 7 stated to be within their right to print.
Emergence of a Free Press is an important book not only because it sup-
plements current information about the period in the American colonies
just prior to the adoption of the first amendment, but also because it
seriously erodes the credibility of its author's earlier book, Legacy of Sup-
pression." Constitutional scholars received Legacy (published in 1960) with
wide acclaim and considered it to be the definitive work on the historical
background of the first amendment.9 The book was cited and often
quoted in most constitutional law textbooks.10 Levy had done enormous
research, checking original sources and reading the writings of various
individuals who were alive during the period just prior to and immedi-
ately after the adoption of the first amendment. Levy based his conclu-
sions on his interpretations of these original sources, and not on the later
writings ofJames Madison, et al.' I Levy did not rely on these later writ-
ings, written around the time that Congress passed the Sedition Act of
1798,12 because he considered them to be "untrustworthy."' 3
According to Levy, Legacy was a revisionist interpretation. 14 It pro-
pounded the thesis that the Framers of the Constitution intended to cod-
ify the concept of "no prior restraint" that Blackstone enunciated.' 5 It
claimed that any larger libertarian intent of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion was "not proven."'16 Constitutional scholars based the credibility of
these propositions on the eminence of Levy as an historian and on his
known personal bias in favor of an expansive view of the first amend-
ment.17 Thus, Levy's conclusion that nothing indicated that the Framers
intended the constitutional guarantee of a free press to mean that the
government could not prosecute anyone for seditious utterances' 8 was
extremely persuasive.
It is true that Levy tried to mitigate a possible harsh result of his
7 EMERGENCE, supra note 3, at 119-123.
8 L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION, (1960) [hereinafter dted as LEGACY].
9 See, e.g., Berlin, Book Review, 72 YALE LJ. 631 (1963); Cound, Book Review, 36 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 253 (1961); Jensen, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1961); Lewis, Book Review, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 608 (1961); Meiklejohn, Book Review, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 111 (1961); Whyte, Book
Review, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 540 (1962).
10 See, e.g., Carter, Franklin & Wright, supra note 2, at 16-18; W. COHEN &J. KAPLAN, CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 20, 25, 26, 27 (2nd Ed. 1982); G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, 975 (11th Ed. 1975); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 834 (3rd Ed. 1986).
11 LEGACY, supra note 8, at 248-297.
12 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1845).
13 LEGACY, supra note 8, at 245.
14 Id. at vii.
15 "The liberty ofthepress is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists of laying
no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published." Id. at 14.
16 Id. at 237.
17 "This has been a difficult book to write, because the facts have dictated conclusions that vio-
late my predilictions. . .", id. at viii.
18 Id. at 236.
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interpretation' 9 by stating in the concluding sentence of the main text
"That... Oust because the Framers] were Blackstonians does not mean
that we cannot be Brandeisians." 20 He wanted, perhaps, to tell judges
and legal scholars that his conclusions concerning the intent of the Fram-
ers should not constrain them when they interpret the speech and press
clause. While this suggestion expresses the view of many United States
Supreme Court Justices, such as William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and
William 0. Douglas, it certainly does not persuade those Justices that
believe that the Court should interpret the Constitution on the basis of
"original intent."' 21
If the "original intent" of the Framers really could be proven to be
as narrow as Levy had concluded it to be, any expansion of speech and
press rights would be without historical foundation. Thus, the views of
scholars such as Zachariah Chaffee, Jr.,22 who believed that the Framers
wrote the first amendment in order to eliminate the common law of sedi-
tious libel and prevent prosecution for criticism of the government,
could be considered merely hortatory.23 Levy did state that the meaning
of the first amendment's provision for freedom of speech and press at the
time of its framing and ratification is quite obscure,24 but in the end he
concluded that the evidence indicated that it was Blackstone's limited
concept of freedom of speech and press which was in the Framers
minds. 2
5
During the late nineteen-seventies and early nineteen-eighties, a
number of articles questioned the absoluteness of Levy's conclusions.2 6
These articles did not question the research which Levy had done, but
rather questioned the conclusions that Levy reached from the facts that
his research uncovered.2 7 Meanwhile Levy, after some twenty years, was
rethinking, but not really revising his own conclusions in light of the new
research which had been done in the interim.28 Finally, in 1985, he pub-
lished Emergence of a Free Press. While constitutional scholars should prob-
ably consider the new book as merely an updated version of Legacy of
Suppression, with additional source material, the fact that Levy gave it a
new title strongly indicates that he intended it to supplant the earlier
19 In fact, Justice Brennan cited LEGACY to support his decision in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1963).
20 LEGACY, supra note 8, at 309.
21 "Rehnquist summed up his belief in the centrality of original intent as a search for what 'the
words... [the Framers] used meant to them."' Howard,Justice William H. Rehnquist, A Key Fighter in
Major Battles, 72 A.B.A. J. 46, 48 (Special Issue June 15, 1986).
22 Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
23 LEGACY, supra note 8, at 1-3.
24 Idt at 4.
25 Id at 201-202, 215-216.
26 See, e.g., Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455 (1983); Buel, Freedom of
the Press in Revolutionary America: The Evolution of Libertarianism 1760-1820 in B. BAiLYN &J. HENCH,
THE PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 59 (1980); Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); Smith, A Reappraisal of Legislative Privilege and
American Colonial Journalism, 61 JOURNALISM 0.97 (1984).
27 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 26, at 472, 486, 505, 508.
28 See the Bibliography in EMERGENCE, supra note 3, at 351-372, which includes unpublished
student papers and doctoral dissertations from 1963-1977, at 371-372.
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work and that it is therefore not a revised second edition.2 9 This propo-
sition is difficult to believe. The change in title is misleading, since the
organization 30 and most of the sources31 of the two works are quite simi-
lar. Even the conclusion, while less absolute, remains essentially the
same.3 2 The concluding sentences in the later work replace the refer-
ences to Blackstone and Brandeis with "What... [the Framers] said is far
more important than what they meant. It is enough that they gave con-
stitutional recognition to the principle of freedom of speech and press in
unqualified and undefined terms.'"'s
It is not this softened conclusion, however, which should hearten the
expansive civil libertarians. It is that this later work, while not denigrat-
ing the pioneering research contribution of the earlier work, destroys the
credibility of its conclusions. Remarkably, it is Levy who discredits him-
self. This happens in two ways. First of all, in Levy's startling revelation
contained in the Preface to Emergence of a Free Press, he claims: "I wrote
Legacy of Suppression to spite [Robert M.] Hutchins and The Fund [for the
Republic, Inc.] and as a result of a chance opportunity to explore the
subject." 34 This description of the author's state of mind at the time he
wrote Legacy of Suppression does support his claim that his "conclusions"
were antithetical to his personal predilictions.35 What is now suspect,
however, is his motivation. The Preface raises serious questions regard-
ing Levy's ability to fairly evaluate the original historical data. The fact
that the later work continues to press the same conclusions in the face of
this confession only increases the doubt as to the impartiality of Levy's
earlier findings. The reader must now question the relevance of this con-
fession to the purpose of both the first and second book.
The second discrediting factor to the author's new book is the stri-
dent and, at times violent, tone which Levy uses when he attempts to
deny the validity of any, even mild, differences of opinion.3 6 Since some
of the opinions which he attacks are in unpublished manuscripts,3 7 it is
hard to understand why he even mentions them. Levy's critics might
have been guilty of misinterpreting sources, 38 but the vehemence of his
rebuttals causes the reader to think that the author "doth protest too
29 The change in title means, however, that both works will be freestanding in library catalogs
and readers of LEGACY will not necessarily be informed of the existence of EMERGENCE.
30 The tables of contents are very similar, some of the chapter headings are identical (e.g. Chap-
ters I and II), and while EMERGENCE has ten chapters against LEGACY'S six, the six chapter headings
of LEGACY are repeated in EMERGENCE and in the same order.
31 See the bibliographies in EMERGENCE, supra note 3, at 351-372, and LEGACY, supra note 8, at
321-339; only the addition of lists of newspapers, unpublished student papers and a few new entries
distinguishes EMERGENCE from LEGACY.
32 "I am still convinced, however, that the revolutionary generation did not seek to wipe out the
core idea of seditious libel", EMERGENCE, supra note 3, at xii.
33 Id. at 349.
34 Id. at ix.
35 See supra note 17.
36 See, e.g., EMERGENCE, supra note 3, at 38 n.79 ("putative reply"); at 83 ("Another historian...
after looking at only a dozen cases, which he counted as twenty and after botching his presentation");
id. at 87 n.70 ("who perverts what I said ... yet freely borrows without giving credit"); id. at 259 n. 106
("Apart from the fact that his ipse dixit proves nothing, he was wrong in fact.") (Emphases added).
37 See, e.g., id. at 65 n.8 ("purports to be a repudiation of Legacy").
38 "Wilson was not being hypothetical as some recent scholars have argued." Id at 240-241.
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much."'3 9 It is as if Levy is saying that only Levy can be right. But since
Levy, in the Preface to Emergence of a Free Press, states that "I was
wrong," 4° his unnecessary attempts to discredit others only damages his
own credibility. Thus, constitutional scholars are left in the perhaps for-
tunate position of no longer being able to rely on Levy's conclusion con-
cerning the meaning of the speech and press clause of the Constitution
as the definitive conclusion. Levy's conclusion has become only one
among many.
Levy has made a most important contribution to our understanding
of American history and the background of the first amendment. He has
forced us to focus on the happenings and the documents of the period,
not on some imaginary picture of pre-revolutionary times.4' His work
should, therefore, not be disregarded and forgotten. But we will proba-
bly never know the exact intent of the Framers when they declared that
"Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the
press." Levy contends that he has proved that the Framers narrowly con-
strued these words. Yet others believe that the Framers intended them
to be expansively construed.42 Still others believe that the Framers had
no intent at all, and therefore the words have meaning only as courts give
it to them.43 The fact that Levy's own statements have undermined his
firm position is the great contribution of his second work. Textbook au-
thors, therefore, should not cite his conclusions as definitive. Scholars
no longer need to attempt to refute his proposition that we can find the
entire meaning of the first amendment in Blackstone. That has neither
been proven nor disproven. The background of the words remains am-
biguous, although the words themselves are clear. We should, therefore,
give the meaning to the words of the first amendment that is appropriate
for the current times.
39 W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene 2, line 233.
40 EMERGENCE, supra note 3 at x.
41 IdL at xii.
42 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
43 Bevier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 307 (1978).
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